Miranda Fricker is a contemporary British philosopher best known for pioneering the concept of epistemic injustice — the unfair treatment a person experiences specifically in their capacity as a knower, speaker or interpreter of their own experience. Her landmark book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007) showed that injustice is not only about wealth, rights or political influence, but also about who gets believed, and who has the concepts available to make sense of their own experience.
This article explains Fricker’s two core forms of epistemic injustice — testimonial injustice, where prejudice causes someone’s word to be trusted less than it should be, and hermeneutical injustice, where societal gaps in shared understanding leave a person unable to fully articulate a significant experience. It also covers her ideas on identity power, hermeneutical marginalisation, her virtue-epistemological response calling for reflexive, responsible listening, and her influence on feminist epistemology, education, healthcare, law and disability studies. Useful for students of political theory, philosophy, gender studies and UPSC or state civil services aspirants.
Author: Darshita Neeraj
Senior Researcher,
Mudita Learning and Knowledge Private Limited
Email: info@muditabooks.com
Date of post: 27.08.2026
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